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INTRODUCTION
ublic participation in environmental decision-making is
largely unexplored territory for attorneys. To the extent attor-
neys have shown any interest in such participation, it has been
limited to public access to administrative hearings,' the courts,2
or meetings of government bodies.3 In short, most attention is
focused on the notice and comment process. 4
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1. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-596 (1994). See
also Horn v. County of Ventura, 596 P.2d 1134 (Cal. 1979); Phibro Re-
sources Corp. v. State Dep't of Envtl. Regulation, 579 So. 2d 118 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
2. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
3. See, e.g., Krause v. Reno, 366 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979).
4. See Ann Bray, Comment, Scientific Decision Making: A Barrier to
Citizen Participation in Environmental Agency Decision Making, 17 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 1111, 1122 (1991).
The majority of citizens become aware of an environmental
issue only when their community is faced with the effects of
an agency's decision to issue a permit for a landfill or other
undesirable activity. At this stage in the decision making pro-
cess, the facts, inferences, and assumptions, marshalled by an
agency in support of its decision, take on the characteristics
of an irrebuttable presumption of validity in favor of the
agency - a presumption that citizens at the community level
rarely have the scientific or legal expertise to challenge.
Id. at 1122. See also John Charles Sassaman, Jr., Comment, Siting Without
Fighting: The Role of Mediation in Enhancing Public Participation in Siting
Radioactive Waste Facilities, 2 ALB. LJ. Sci. & TECH. 207, 220 (1992)
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In the 1980s, however, it became obvious that public participa-
tion limited to the notice and comment process could not en-
sure public satisfaction with the process or results.5 Americans in-
creasingly demanded direct and active participation in public
decision making, 6 and in the process rejected the notion that ex-
perts and bureaucrats should hold a monopoly on environmental
decisions. In the absence of public involvement, the governmen-
tal body responsible for a decision found its credibility slipping,
and its legitimacy publicly questioned.'
"Announce and defend" environmental decision-making
proved untenable, as it lacked political viability.8 Other research
(" [P]ublic hearings are often viewed as a ritual rather than an effective
way to solicit comments from the public.").
5. See DANIEL MAZEMEN & DAVID MORELL, BEYOND SUPERFAILURE:
AMERICA'S ToxIcs POLICY FOR THE 1990S 9 (1992); Susan G. Hadden,
Public Perception of Hazardous Waste, 11 RiSK ANALYSIS 47, 50 (1991); Rob-
ert B. Reich, Public Administration and Public Deliberation: An Interpretive
Essay, 94 YALE LJ. 1617 (1985); Daniel J. Fiorino, Environmental Risk and
Democratic Process: A Critical Review, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 501, 502
(1989).
6. Environmental decision-making is inherently a political activity.
See SHELDON KRIMSKY & ALONOZO PLOUGH, ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS:
COMMUNICATING RISKS AS A SOCIAL PROCESS 2 (1988).
7. Legitimacy of law is marked by fair decision-making processes as
well as incorporation of society's conception of fairness and justice. See
HERBERT JACOB, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES (Harper Col-
lins 1995).
The idea that a law gains legitimacy when it represents the
will of the people is not new. Public participation in the for-
mation of a policy or law ensures that it reflects the will of
the people. Not allowing public participation leaves the for-
mulation and implementation of a law open to criticism in
terms of its legitimacy, and leaves the public with the impres-
sion that the government is merely imposing its will upon
the people.
Sassaman, supra note 4, at 208. See also Bunyan Bryant, Summary, in EN-
VIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: ISSUES, POLICIES, AND SOLUTIONS 208, 212 (Bunyan
Bryant ed., 1995) ("Policies may gain acceptance by community groups,
particularly if such groups are involved in their formulation.")
8. See Fiorino, supra note 5, at 502. See also Elaine Hiruo, Consensus-
Building Produces New Dawn For Public Involvement, NUCLEONICS WEEK,
Apr. 22, 1993, available in 1993 WL 2420988.
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indicates that citizens and academics view environmental deci-
sions as value-laden;9 therefore, leaving such decisions in the
hands of scientists, engineers, or bureaucrats is frequently re-
jected.10 The 1980s gave witness to public agitation in the face of
decisions reached without full public input. Protests persisted
over highway expansion," siting of low-level radioactive waste fa-
cilities, 12 ethanol rulemaking, 3 hazardous waste characteriza-
tion, 14 animal extinction, 5 and oil rigs in lakes. 16 In the absence
of effective public participation laws, a dissatisfied populace will
turn to other forms of political expression and redress, most fre-
quently litigation. 7 Yet litigation implies high costs and ineffi-
9. See, e.g., SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA 65 (1995); Fremont J. Lyden et al., Citizen Par-
ticipation in Long-Range Planning: The RPA Experience, 30 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 123 (1990) (planning decisions affected by decision-maker's values).
See generally L. GRAHAM, BETWEEN SCIENCE AND VALUES (1981). Propo-
nents of environmental justice argue that more public involvement is
needed as mainstream environmental organizations have been criti-
cized for their lack of democracy. See WILLIAM TUCKER, PROGRESS AND
PRIVILEGE: AMERICA IN THE AGE OF ENVIRONMENTALISM 37-38 (1992).
Moreover, critics have noted that the environmental agenda reflects
only middle-class concerns, and cooperativeness with corporate
America. See PHILIP SHABECOFF, A FIERCE GREEN FIRE: THE AMERICAN EN-
VIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 282-83 (1993).
10. Jasanoff explains that American political culture rejects expert
decision-making. See Sheila Jasanoff, American Exceptionalism and Political
Culture, 119 DAEDALUS 77 (Fall 1990) [hereinafter American
Exceptionalism].
11. Sally Hicks, Quality of Life Debate Follows Duraleigh Link, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC), July 31, 1995, at Al.
12. See Richard R. Zuercher, Pennsylvania Scraps Coerced LLW Siting
Plan for Voluntary Process, NUCLEONICS WEEK, Aug. 3, 1995, at 2.
13. See Stephen Green, Suit Accuses State Leader of Secret Tie to Oil
Lobby, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 24, 1995, at Al.
14. See Chris Bowman, Suit Lost on Toxics at Base McClellan Area:
Group "Satisfied" with Cleanup, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 3, 1995, at B1.
15. See Suit: U.S. Delay Moves Fish Towards Extinction, TIMES-PICAYUNE
(New Orleans), June 3, 1995, at A6.
16. See Chris Gray, Oil vs. Water: Wildcatter Takes on Pontchartrain
Ban, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), June 11, 1995, at Al.
17. See Mimi Larsen Becker, The International Joint Commission and
Public Participation: Past Experiences, Present Challenges, Future Tasks, 33
1997]
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ciencies which have been extensively documented." Despite the
public backlash to "announce and defend" decision-making,
some scholars are advocating less public participation in environ-
mental decision-making, 19 implicitly rejecting the value of public
participation laws and regulations.
The Fernald Environmental Management Project ("Fernald"),
presently overseen by the United States Department of Energy
("DOE") exemplifies the public participation of the prehearing
stages of environmental policy formation. Fernald is one of
about twenty installations at which nuclear weapons and their
components were processed in support of the Cold War
buildup. 20 Over one billion cubic feet of federal-facility21 hazard-
NAT. RESOURCES J. 235, 240 (1993); cf Marianne Dugan, Citizen Participa-
tion in Wetlands Planning in the Pacific Northwest, 9 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG.
29, 32-33 (1994) (showing that federal agencies' failure to engage pub-
lic in wetlands regulation promulgation has resulted in litigation). Doc-
umenting some of the history of public participation in land usage reg-
ulation, ZygmuntJ. B. Plater notes that when "public debate on federal
clear-cutting programs was not possible, the public-interest citizens
could either go home or go to court. As in so many other tough issues,
they chose the latter." Zygmunt J.B. Plater, From the Beginning, A Funda-
mental Shift of Paradigms: A Theory and Short History of Environmental Law,
27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 981, 989 (1994).
18. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 17, at 240; Richard J. Lazarus, The
Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal Environmental Law, 54
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 355 (1991) (citing JAMES Q. WILSON, Bu-
REAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT
(1990)).
19. Justice Breyer, for example, argues that environmental deci-
sions should be made by an elite group of bureaucrats. See STEPHEN
BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CYCLE 61 (1993); see also Frank B. Cross,
The Public Role in Risk Control, 24 ENVTL. L. 888, 950-58 (1994) (arguing
that only public perception validated by mainstream science should af-
fect public environmental decisions).
20. See CLEANING UP THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S NUCLEAR WEAP-
ONS COMPLEX, A CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE STUDY, May 1994, at 1
[hereinafter CBO STUDY]. There are over 2,000 federal facilities in the
United States, many of which contain used or decaying nuclear and
conventional weapons, and their by-products from production. Much of
this waste is toxic or suspected to be toxic. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
("GAO"), FEDERAL FACILITIES: CONSISTENT RELATIVE RISK EVALUATIONS
NEEDED FOR PRIORITIZING CLEANUPS 2-3 (June 1996). Fifteen facilities are
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ous and radioactive waste was disposed of at federal facilities
from the 1940s to the 1980s.22 At the fifteen major facilities there
are over one hundred million gallons of highly radioactive waste,
sixty-six million gallons of waste contaminated with plutonium,
and larger volumes of waste with lower levels of radioactivity.23 Es-
timates of the cost of cleanup vary widely, from hundreds of bil-
lions to one trillion dollars. 24 This does not account for the waste
produced by commercial nuclear power plants. 25
The decision-making process at the Fernald facility, in contrast
to processes used at other federal facilities, 26 has proven relatively
successful. Fernald decision-makers have evaluated how to con-
trol ongoing risk, and have completed most of the long-term
cleanup plans.2 7 The program at Fernald is far from ideal. How-
ever, in comparison to other large-scale, long-term, environmen-
tally hazardous sites, it presents a model for making politically vi-
able cleanup decisions.
28
considered by DOE to be "major." Those are located in twelve states.
CBO STUDY, supra, at ix.
21. Federal facilities are those owned or operated by a federal
agency. See Nelson D. Cary, Note, A Primer on Federal Facility Compliance
with Environmental Laws: Where Do We Go From Here?, 50 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 801, 801 (1993).
22. See Scott Sonner, Nuclear Cleanup Crews Resist New Technology,
TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Sept. 1, 1994, at A14.
23. See CBO STUDY, supra note 20, at 1.
24. See infta note 106. A similar problem exists with respect to nu-
clear energy decommissioning, an issue America will face in the twenty-
first century as many facilities will undergo the process of decommis-
sioning. Estimates for decommissioning nuclear energy plants run be-
tween millions to billions of dollars. For further information, see
CYNTHIA POLLOCK, DECOMMISSIONING NUCLEAR POWER'S MISSING LINK 69
(Worldwatch Paper 1986).
25. For further information on nuclear waste disposal, see Nuclear
Waste Disposal. A Symposium, 53 TENN. L. REV. 475 (1986).
26. See generally CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL
CLEANUP ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH CLOSING MILITARY BASES 2 (1992) (only
three percent of sites completely closed).
27. See SALLY O'CONNOR ET AL., XAVIER UNIV. OF LA., INVENTORY OF
PUBLIC CONCERNS AT THE FERNALD ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT PRO-
JECT 4-3 (4 CERE Public Concerns Report, Dec. 1995) [hereinafter
CERE PUBLIC CONCERNS].
28. For a discussion of programs that have not promoted meaning-
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This Article examines public participation as it occurs in the
prehearing stage of environmental policy formation. It considers
what facilitated the Fernald decision-making process. Part I of
this Article focuses on limitations to the doctrine of sovereign
immunity which had historically insulated federal, agencies from
compliance with environmental law. Part II focuses on public
participation law. Part III presents an historical background to
the Fernald facility. Part IV provides an analysis of the policy for-
mation process used at Fernald. This Article concludes that sub-
stantial public involvement in policy formation and decision-
making ensures stable and acceptable decisions in the context of
remediating high-risk, large-scale environmental hazards.
I. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND FEDERAL AGENCY COMPLIANCE WITH
ENVIRONMENTAL LAw
Federal law is designed to ensure that waste falling within the
definition of "hazardous" will be properly treated and stored. 29
The so-called "cradle-to-grave" approach is codified in the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"). 3° Cleanup of
hazardous waste caused by past practices is governed by the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Li-
ability Act ("CERCLA").31 In 1986, Congress amended CERCLA
to include what is commonly known as "Superfund, '' 32 which cre-
ated a fund for the cleanup of CERCLA sites.33
DOE was slow and reluctant in complying with federal environ-
mental laws.34 In particular, it resisted state regulations, which in
ful public participation, see Owen Olpin, Toward Jeffersonian Governance
of the Public Lands, 27 Lo. L.A. L. REV. 959 (1994).
29. See, e.g., 135 CONG. REc. H3893-3902, H3902.
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1994). RCRA's primary purpose is to
enforce safety standards in the production and management of hazard-
ous waste.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9675 (1994).
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 and scattered sections of Titles 26, 33,
and 49 of the United States Code.
33. Federal facilities cleanup is not financed through Superfund
monies. Congress appropriates funds for each installation. See, e.g., 42
U.S.C. § 9620(e) (3).
34. For example, at Fernald in 1995, DOE attempted to
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some cases provided stricter standards than federal law.35 In a se-
ries of decisions in the 1970s through the end of 1992, federal
courts supported DOE's position that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity shielded it from compliance with agency regulations.
36
The debate over DOE compliance with state and federal environ-
mental laws37 was largely settled by the enactment of two federal
laws: the Environmental Restoration and Management provisions
of the National Defense Authorization Act ("NDAA"), 38 and the
recharacterize waste in order to avoid RCRA compliance. This was at
the same time that EPA had designated Fernald as the worst emitter of
radionuclides in the nation. See infra Part III.
35. Under the federal environmental laws, compliance with state
environmental law will satisfy the federal requirements when the state
regulations are more stringent than the federal regulations. See Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1994) (stating that state
law is not preempted unless it is less stringent than federal standards).
Federal facilities are required to follow the applicable state regulations
when they apply; CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a) (4) (stating that federal
law applies to federal facilities provided that the facility is not on the
National Priority List and the standards are not more stringent than
those applicable to non-federal facilities); see also Clean Air Act
("CAA"), 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (1994) (stating that state law is not pre-
empted by the CAA except in limited circumstances).
36. See United States Department of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607
(1992) (denying RCRA state-imposed penalty); Gwaltney of Smithfield,
Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987) (holding no
fines or penalties may be imposed for isolated or sporadic violations of
RCRA); Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 178-79 (1976) (citing
M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 426 (1819)); Mitzelfelt v. Depart-
ment of Air Force, 903 F.2d 1293 (10th Cir. 1990) (shielding Air Force
from following New Mexico's hazardous waste law under doctrine of
sovereign immunity; holding § 6001 of RCRA did not waive sovereign
immunity to state-imposed penalties); United States v. State of Washing-
ton, 872 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1989) (denying fines or penalties for iso-
lated or sporadic violations of RCRA); McClellan Ecological Seepage
Situation v. Weinberger, 655 F. Supp. 601 (E.D. Cal. 1986) (upholding
Clean Air Act penalties; denying RCRA and Federal Water Pollution
Control Act penalties).
37. Under CERCLA and the federal compliance agreements, DOE
must follow all "applicable or relevant and appropriate requirements,"
known by the acronym "ARAR." 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(e)(2)(1)(A)
(1995).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 7274a-1 (Supp. V 1993).
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Federal Facilities Compliance Act ("FFCA"). 39 Under NDAA,
DOE is required to prepare an annual report for each facility
which needs remediation and to outline a restoration plan which
complies with all environmental laws.40 In turn, section 120 of
CERCLA requires DOE to negotiate with EPA and the host state
or states as to the terms of an environmental restoration plan of
action which the parties memorialize in a compliance agreement
or compliance order.4' FFCA was designed to ensure that federal
agencies would comply with state environmental laws. In particu-
lar, it seeks to enhance a state's power to fine violators and en-
force compliance. 42
DOE, EPA, and the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency
("Ohio") negotiated and executed a series of compliance agree-
ments which govern Fernald.43 These agreements have been peri-
odically revised, and at times have been the subject of litigation
which resulted in compliance orders or additional agreements. 4
39. 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1994) (amendment to RCRA). In signing the
FFCA into law, President George Bush stated that it was designed "to
bring all Federal facilities into compliance with applicable federal and
state hazardous waste laws, to waive federal sovereign immunity under
those laws, and to allow the imposition of fines and penalties." State-
ment by President Bush Upon Signing, H.R. 2194, reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1337.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 72 74 g (1994). This section provides, inter alia, that
"the plan. shall include . . . [a] description of the actions, including
identification of specific projects, necessary to maintain or achieve
compliance with Federal, state, or local environmental laws, regula-
tions, permits, orders, or agreements." Id.
41. Id. § 9620.
42. There is also one Executive Order governing federal facility
compliance with environmental laws. Executive Order No. 12,088, 3
C.F.R. § 243 (1979), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994), re-
quires referral of inter-agency conflicts over environmental law compli-
ance to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for resolution.
43. See CERE PUBLIC CONCERNS, supra note 27, at 2-5.
44. The original CERCLA agreement became effective on April 9,
1990. Adm. Doc. No. V-W-90-C-057. This agreement was amended as of
September 20, 1991. In essence, this is the primary cleanup agreement,
which includes the Remedial Investigation / Feasibility Study ("RI/FS")
schedule for the five operable units ("OUS") located on the facility.
Adm. Doc. No. V-W-90-C-057. The RCRA compliance agreements may
be found under Adm. Doc. No. RCRA V-W89-R-I1.
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
The compliance agreements governing Fernald require DOE to
comply with all relevant environmental laws and to develop com-
prehensive public participation programs. 45 The compliance
agreements also provide schedules for key events in the decision-
making process, ranging from the time period for deciding what
potentially should be considered in risk assessment studies, to
deadlines for debating alternative cleanup proposals, to a time
frame in which a Record of Decision ("ROD") must be reached.
II. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION LAW
Public participation law exists in labyrinthine form: its require-
ments appear in CERCLA,46 RCRA,47 and NDAA,48 as well as in
the administrative regulations that accompany the statutes. 4
9
Under CERCLA, each unit on a Superfund site must be charac-
terized for risk during a Remedial Investigation ("RI").5 ° A Feasi-
bility Study ("FS") is then completed to consider both the engi-
neering/technical feasibility of the work as well as the cost." The
evaluating agency will usually indicate its preferred cleanup alter-
native for each operable unit ("OU").52 After the RI/FS studies
are completed and the alternative cleanup options chosen, 53
CERCLA guarantees public access to and input into the decision-
making process (the "notice and comment" period).5 4 Once an
agency has considered the public's input, it makes a cleanup de-
cision and memorializes the decision in a ROD.55 Without addi-
tional public participation law, the public only has access to the
record prior to the announcement of the agency-preferred op-
tion; there is no other guarantee that government officials will
45. See infra Part II.
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1994).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 7274a-1.
49. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 300.430 (1995).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 9620(e).
51. 40 C.F.R. § 300.430 (1995).
52. See id. An OU "encompasses a discrete set of facilities or re-
lated problems. CERE PUBLIC CONCERNS, supra note 27, at 2-6.
53. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430 (1995).
54. See 42 U.S.C. § 9617.
55. See id.
1997]
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entertain or respond to the public's comments.5 6 In short, by the
time the public becomes involved, many important decisions will
already have been reached. 7 Thus, momentum will greatly favor
the agency's proposed alternative.58
Recognizing that the notice and comment period is no longer
sufficient,5 9 EPA has promulgated regulations designed to force
agencies to more actively engage the public at earlier stages of
the decision-making process.60 Under EPA regulations, prior to
the notice and comment period for the RI/FS, the public is in-
cluded in scoping and risk assessment activities pursuant to a
Community Relations Plan ("CRP"). That is, EPA gives the pub-
lic an opportunity to define the risks to be analyzed, and the
testing or studying methodology to be used.61 CRPs require an
aggressive and affirmative approach to public participation.62 EPA
56. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(k); cf. United States v. Amtreco, Inc., 806
F. Supp. 1004 (M.D. Ga. 1992) (holding that because no regulations
had been promulgated, public participation process cannot be
enforced).
57. Scientists may not choose the same question or series of ques-
tions of importance to the public. See Lawrence Susskind & Alan Wein-
stein, Towards a Theory of Environmental Dispute Resolution, 14 LAND USE
& ENv'T L. REV. 433, 446-47 n.42 (1983).
58. See, e.g., WADE S. ROBISON, DECISIONS IN DOUBT: THE ENVIRON-
MENT AND PUBLIC POLICY 62-66 (1994). See also Kent E. Portney, Public
Environmental Policy Decision Making: Citizen Roles, in ENVIRONMENTAL DE-
CISION MAKING: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE (Richard A. Chechile &
Susan Carlisle eds., 1991).
59. Public participation limited to notice and comment periods
and rule making hearings has been highly criticized. See generally Barry
Checkoway, The Politics of Public Hearings, 17 J. APPLI. BEHAV. Sci. 566
(1987); Ned Crosby et al., Citizen Panels: A New Approach to Citizen Partic-
ipation, 46 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 170 (1986); Roger C. Cramton, The Why,
Were, and How of Broadened Public Participation in the Administrative Pro-
cess, 60 GEO. LJ. 525 (1972). See also Bray, supra note 4, at 1134 (indicat-
ing that only a minority of cities surveyed thought meetings influenced
agency decision-making, but at the same time, citizens thought they
were a good way to educate the public).
60. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430 (1995).
61. See id. § 35.6105(a) (2) (iv).
62. Additional regulatory guidance is found in EPA's COMMUNITY
RELATIONS IN SUPERFUND: A HANDBOOK (EPA/540/R-921009; NTIS No.
PB92-963341, Jan. 1992), and EPA's RCRA PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT MANUAL
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
actively seeks stakeholder input,63 and employs a variety of infor-
mation mechanisms.64 DOE has agreed to follow this process in
the federal facilities compliance agreements. 6
5
RCRA also recommends public participation in cleanup
plans. 66 EPA, in promulgating rules to effect public participation,
requires that federal agencies maintain a list of interested and af-
fected parties ("lAPs"), provide notification of meetings, notify
the public of any significant decision under consideration, and
provide information about significant decisions.67 In the case of
DOE facilities, the compliance agreements governing cleanup
also incorporate the mandated use of EPA's Community Rela-
tions Handbook ("Handbook"). 68 Pursuant to the Handbook,
federal agencies assume an affirmative duty to seek out lAPs as
well as permit input from the public at the earliest stage it notes
interest.69 In addition, under NDAA, DOE must "consult" with
"interested members of the public" about its annual environ-
mental restoration reports.70 Thus, because of federal statutory
law, EPA regulations, and the compliance agreements between
DOE, EPA, and the host state or states, public participation at
(EPA/530/R-931006; NTIS No. PB93-231066, Sept. 1993).
63. COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN SUPERFUND: A HANDBOOK, supra note
62, at 7.
64. Information "developed, received, published, or made availa-
ble to the public must be accessible for public inspection." Id.
65. Each federal facility is governed by at least one agreement or
compliance order designed to enforce cleanup. These are mandated
under the FFCA, 42 U.S.C. § 9620(e) (2).
66. "Public participation in the development, revision, implemen-
tation, and enforcement of any regulation, guideline, information, or
program under this chapter shall be provided for, encouraged, and as-
sisted by the Administrator [of EPA] and the States. The Administrator,
in cooperation with the States, shall develop and publish minimum
guidelines for public participation in such processes." Id. § 6974(b).
67. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 25.1-.4 (1995). EPA also promulgated sugges-
tions for public participation. See id. § 25.5-.6 (1995).
68. See CERE PUBLIC CONCERNS, supra note 27, at 2-5. See also id. at
2-6 to 2-10 (discussing public participation requirements under the vari-
ous federal laws at Fernald).
69. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF ENERGY, COMMUNITY RELATIONS PLAN 24
(Sept. 1994).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 7274(k) (1994).
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federal facilities is designed to be early, frequent, and
meaningful.
III. THE COLD WAR'S HALF-LIFE: THE LEGACY OF NUCLEAR
PRODUCTION WASTE
The history of nuclear weapons facilities began with the Cold
War.71 Nuclear weapons were produced in this country from the
1940s through the 1980s.72 In most instances, bomb production
facilities were in rural or non-residential areas, far from large
population centers.73 Fernald is atypical, given its close proximity
to Cincinnati, which is approximately seventeen miles from the
gates of the facility.74 It is also unlike most other federal facilities
in that it rests on a relatively small area of land, 1,050 acres hous-
ing approximately 100 buildings.75 The surface, groundwater,
soil, and air around the facility are contaminated. 76 Wastes, left-
over processing materials, and structures may pose human and
ecological health risks.77 Uranium processing wastes, low-level ra-
diation, and mixed wastes are the primary concern for the
public.78
DOE is responsible for the management of Fernald. 79 DOE
and its predecessor organization, the Atomic Energy Commis-
71. The origin of the term "Cold War" is not known. Hugh Bro-
gan suggests that it was coined by journalist Walter Lippman. See HUGH
BROGAN, THE PENGUIN HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 602
n.1 (1985).
72. See generally CBO STUDY, supra note 20, at 1.
73. In comparison, Hanford Reservation encompasses approxi-
mately 353,000 acres in rural Washington. See Shauna Marie Whidden,
The Hanford Reach: Protecting the Columbia's Last Safe Haven for Salmon, 26
ENVTL. L. 265, 266 (1996). Colten and Skinner note that federal facili-
ties were usually located in isolated areas. CRAIG E. COLTEN & PETER N.
SKINNER, THE ROAD TO LOVE CANAL 59 (1996).
74. See CERE PUBLIC CONCERNS, supra note 2.7, at 3-20.
75. See id. at 2-1.
76. See Anne Willette, Court to Mull State's Right to Punish Agencies,
USA TODAY, Dec. 2, 1991, at 10A.
77. See id.
78. See CERE PUBLIC CONCERNS, supra note 27, at 2-4.
79. See generally Michael D'Antonio, Scars and Secrets: The Atomic
Trail, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1994 (Magazine), at 14.
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sion, 80 were veiled in secrecy for about forty years prior to the
transformation of the Soviet Union in 1991.81 Thus, Fernald was
largely a mystery to local citizens until the late 1980s or early
1990s. 8 2 Some local citizens believed that Fernald produced feed
for livestock, as Fernald was known as the Feed Material Produc-
tion Center in the early years.83 The "feed" was, in fact,
processed uranium used in nuclear weapons as part of the Cold
War military buildup.8 4 Though Fernald was gated and access was
restricted, cows were left to graze around the perimeter of the fa-
cility, lending a bucolic look to the semi-rural area.85
By the 1980s, area residents were worried about what they per-
ceived to be inordinately high rates of cancer among the local
residents. 86 Some pondered whether there was a causal nexus be-
tween what was perceived to be a high rate of cancer and the
condition of the natural environment. 87 Fernald workers re-
turned home to their families, recounting the day's events which
included such incidents as workers being covered with radioac-
tive dust,88 or buckets being used to control a leakage of uranyl
80. DOE was established in 1977 by President Jimmy Carter. Prior
to its formation, the Atomic Energy Commission was responsible for
the weapons production facilities.
81. See generally H.L. NIEBURG, NUCLEAR SECRECY AND FOREIGN POLICY
(Public Affairs, 1964). The culture of DOE was one of secrecy and the
process of making policy can be described as "decide, announce and
defend." Slants and Trends, NUCLEAR WASTE NEWS, Apr. 22, 1993, availa-
ble in 1993 WL 2753926. See also CBO STUDY, supra note 23, at 5. With
the appointment of Secretary Hazel O'Leary, DOE was charged with
changing its historical approach to one which was much more open
and inclusive of the public. Prepared Statement of Richard j Guimond, Rear
Admiral, USPHS, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary For Environmental
Management, U.S. Dep't of Energy; Before the Subcommittee on Energy and En-
vironment of the Committee on Science, Before the U.S. House of Representa-
tives, Feb. 14, 1995, available in 1995 WL 59175.
82. See CERE PUBLIC CONCERNS, supra note 27, at 4-3, 4-4, 4-5.
83. See D'Antonio, supra note 79, at 14.
84. See CERE PUBLIC CONCERNS, supra note 27, at 2-1.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 4-5.
87. See id.
88. See Laurie Garrett, Uncle Sam's Hot Spot; Troubles at a Vital Fed-
eral Nuclear Plant, WASH. POST, July 28, 1985 (Magazine), at 6.
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nitrate hexahydrate.8 9
As the Cold War came to a close in the 1980s, more informa-
tion began to leak out about the installation. For example, in
1984, the public learned of the release of 300 pounds of ura-
nium.90 Although DOE initially denied the release, it was later
found to have contaminated three local drinking wells. 91 In addi-
tion, DOE disclosed that approximately 383,000 pounds of ura-
nium were released into the air and water during its thirty-one
years of operation.92 In 1990, DOE agreed to supply local re-
sidents with bottled water in response to concerns that local
drinking water supplies had been contaminated. 93
By 1989, Fernald had ceased production,94 and was placed on
the National Priorities List ("NPL"), 9 a list of Superfund sites re-
quiring long-term remedial cleanup. 96 However, there was little
cleanup progress between the time production ceased until
about 1992. As summarized in a 1991 Senate Committee Report:
Progress in cleaning up the waste and contamination at the
weapons complex is being hampered by a paucity of data and
qualified personnel, inadequate efforts to assess possible off-site
health impacts, lack of ready technical solutions, and public
skepticism about government agency decisions .... Even the
meaning of cleanup is not fully understood . . . [DOE cleanup
progress lacks] credibility and capability.97
By 1995, however, substantial progress had been made at
Fernald. The RI/FS had been completed for four of the five
89. See Paul Barton, Fernald Contractor Gets Slap For Diluted Uranium
Spill, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, July 13, 1993, at BO. See also Katherine
Rizzo, Fernald Had Bucket Brigade For Spill, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland),
July 13, 1993, at 3B.
90. See Garrett, supra note 88, at 6.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See CERE PUBLIC CONCERNS, supra note 27, at 4-5, 4-6.
94. See id. at 4-2.
95. See Federal Agency Hazardous Waste Compliance Docket, 54
Fed. Reg. 51,472 (1989).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 9605.
97. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, COMPLEX CLEANUP: THE EN-
VIRONMENTAL LEGACY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, REPORT TO SENATE ARMED
SERVICES COMMITTEE (Feb. 8, 1991).
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OUs;98 three OUs had passed through the ROD process;99 and
preliminary land use decisions had been made. 0 0 In contrast,
many other facilities have not even passed through the RI/FS
process. 0 1 Unlike Fernald, most facilities have only been manag-
ing and studying waste and hazards rather than making decisions
about how best to clean these facilities. 02 Accordingly, projected
costs of cleanup continue to escalate while the hazards persist. 0 3
Our children and their children's children will confront the
danger of the Cold War buildup, as radioactive waste continues
to be hazardous for thousands of years. 0 4 They will also face the
costs for these facilities. Federal nuclear waste facilities cost more
to run today and usually employ more personnel than they did
during production years. 0 5 The estimated cleanup costs vary
widely, but all are now in the billions of dollars. 10 6 America has
98. See CERE PUBLIC CONCERNS, supra note 27, at 2-6, 4-2.
99. See id. at 4-3.
100. See id. at 4-2.
101. See id. at 4-3.
102. "The Energy Department has spent $23 billion over the past
five years to clean up nuclear waste sites, but little cleanup has re-
sulted." Sonner, supra note 22, at A14.
103. See Garrett, supra note 88, at 6.
104. See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: FROM RESOURCES TO RECOVERY 561-62
(Celia Campbell-Mohm et al. eds., 1993). Plutonium-239, for example,
has a half life of 24,400 years. See THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM & RONALD H.
ROSENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW 784 (1996).
105. See, e.g., John H. Cushman, Jr., Nuclear Arms Cleanup Plan Is
Impossible, Senators Say, N.Y TIMES, Mar. 15, 1995, at A22 (discussing the
Hanford Nuclear Reservation). "The cleanup effort there employs
18,000 people, far more than ever' worked there building nuclear
bombs, and has cost $7.5 billion so far, but has accomplished little per-
manent cleanup and has barely begun to address the most severe
problems at the site." Id.
106. A sample of estimates shows the scope of the problem: In
1988, DOE estimated cleanup costs at $66 to $110 billion. In 1992 the
General Accounting Office ("GAO") estimated cleanup costs at $66 to
$110 billion. See CLEANUP TECHNOLOGY: BETTER MANAGEMENT FOR DOE's
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM 1 (GAO/RCED-92-145, Apr. 1992).
By 1993, this estimate had increased from $400 billion to $1 trillion. See
CBO STUDY, supra note 20; at 1. In 1994 the General Accounting Office
estimated total cleanup costs at $300 billion. Sonner, supra note 22, at
A14. The total cost of DOE facility cleanup was estimated at $600 bil-
lion in 1993. See New Public Participation Planning Teams at Core of DOE
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yet to remediate a facility such that its citizens can be reasonably
assured that it does not present a risk to the public, or that the
level of risk is acceptable. In many ways Fernald presents the
most promising case, as the risks are at least currently under
control, and plans have been accepted by the public for future
long-term cleanup. 10 7 The history of public participation at
Fernald centers on one activist organization, the Fernald Re-
sidents for Environmental Safety and Health ("FRESH"). 108 Since
its founding in 1984, FRESH has been the most vocal and active
player in public participation at Fernald. 0 9 Since 1992, FRESH
has worked with the local DOE to devise cleanup options accept-
able to both parties."0
IV. ANALYSIS
Transforming the relationship between FRESH and DOE re-
quired overcoming two fundamental obstacles: public perception
about the health risks associated with radioactive waste"' and dis-
trust of DOE that had festered over the course of forty years. 1 2
In general, the public"3 fears radioactive waste and its conse-
quences:" 4 catastrophe, cancers, and even the adverse health ef-
Cleanup Efforts, Official Says, [Current Dev.] 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 3049,
3049 (Mar. 26, 1993).
107. See CERE PUBLIC CONCERNS, supra note 27, at 4-3, 4-8, 4-9.
108. See FERNALD COMMUNITY RELATIONS PLAN 1994 (addressing how
DOE has attempted to solicit public participation) [hereinafter COMMU-
NITY RELATIONS PLAN].
109. See CERE PUBLIC CONCERNS, supra note 2.7, at 4-2, 4-3.
110. See generally COMMUNITY RELATIONS PLAN, supra note 108.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. "The public" are those who are not educated or employed as
scientists or engineers. The use of the word "public" and "publics" are
being used interchangeably in this Article. The author wishes to note,
however, that these terms are largely an abstraction, and do not ade-
quately describe the range of opinions and groups present in society. A
more detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this Article. For further
reading, see Norman Wengert, Environmental Policy and Political Deci-
sions: The Reconciliation of Facts, Values and Interests, in POLITICS AND EcoL-
OGY 40, 45 (Phillip 0. Foss ed., 1992).
114. See Paul Slovic et al., Lessons from Yucca Mountain, 33 ENV'T 7,
28 (1991); see also Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 ScI. 280 (1987);
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fects of small or limited exposures to radioactive waste." 5
At Fernald, the public felt that it had been involuntarily ex-
posed to life-threatening and quality-of-life risks. 1 6 It was doubt-
ful about DOE's credibility; indeed, managers of nuclear waste
are generally not trusted." 7 For decades, the public had not par-
ticipated in bureaucratic decisions which it felt adversely im-
pacted the local community."8 DOE's reluctance to follow envi-
ronmental laws imposed on the private sector further
undermined its credibility."9 Finally, once DOE began to ac-
knowledge its responsibility under environmental laws, it was un-
able to meet all the deadlines scheduled under the compliance
agreements.
21
To move the environmental decision-making process forward,
DOE Fernald was charged with establishing a relationship based
on trust with the local active public. DOE also had to allay public
fears about the risks posed by the contamination, caused by the
installation or by DOE's activities.' 2' Thus, the local DOE's task
Richard Wilson & E.A.C. Crouch, Risk Assessment and Comparisons, 236
Sci. 267 (1987).
115. Scientists are generally less alarmed about the health risks
posed by radioactive waste. See Jeff Wheelwright, Atomic Overreaction, AT-
LANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 1995, at 26; James Flynn et al., Decidedly Different:
Expert and Public Views of Risks from A Radioactive Waste Repository, 13 RISK
ANALYSIS 771 (1994); Peter M. Sandman et al., Agency Communication,
Community Outrage, and Perception of Risk: Three Simultaneous Experiments,
12 RISK ANALYSIS 585, 585 (1993).
116. See CERE PUBLIC CONCERNS, supra note 27, at 4-8, 5-10, 5-11.
Risk assessment literature indicates that the public will more likely re-
ject information concerning involuntary risks than those undertaken
voluntarily. See generally Paul Slovic, Perceived Risk, Trust, and Democracy,
13 RISK ANALYSIS 675, 676 (1993).
117. See Slovic et al., supra note 114, at 7.
118. See CERE PUBLIC CONCERNS, supra note 27, at 2-1, 4-8.
119. See id. at 2-5, 2-6.
120. Whether or not the deadlines were realistic, given the state of
science and technology as well as the political climate goes beyond the
scope of this Article. However, it is apparent that the public was usually
displeased when deadlines were not met. See id. at 4-9.
121. Contemporary public participation research has documented
the indispensable role of trust in government-sponsored public partici-
pation programs. See, e.g., L. Robin Keeler & Rakesh K. Sarin, Fair
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was largely to assure the public that it was no longer cloaked in
secrecy1 2 and that it did not operate outside of the law.123 Yet,
public risk perception coupled with DOE's forty-year history of
secrecy, almost guaranteed that the public would not easily ac-
cept policy decisions 24 with respect to risk assessment and
remediation.125
Processes for Societal Decisions Involving Distributional Inequalities, 15 RISK
ANALYSIS 49-59 (1995); DANIEL A. MAZMANLAN & JEANNE NIENABER, CAN
ORGANIZATIONS CHANGE? (The Brookings Institute, 1994); Becker, supra
note 17, at 235; IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (Oxford University Press,
1992); Paul Slovic et al., supra note 114, at 7; FremontJ. Lyden et al.,
Citizen Participation in Long-Range Planning: The RPA Experience, 30 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 123 (Winter 1990).
122. Open government is a hallmark of legitimacy in the Ameri-
can conception of democracy. See generally RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 23-28 (1992).
123. See Richard N.L. Andrews, Risk Assessment: Regulation and Be-
yond, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990s 167-86 (Norman J. Vig &
Michael E. Kraft eds., 1990) (emphasizing the importance of open
communication). See also John S. Applegate, Worst Things First: Risk, In-
formation, and Regulatory Structure in Toxics Substance Control, 9 YALE J. ON
REG. 277, 322 n.236 (citing Weyerhaueser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011,
1030-31 (D.C. Cir. 1978)); United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods.
Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251-52 (2d Cir. 1977); Portland Cement Ass'n v.
Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
921 (1974) ("[A]n agency must make full disclosure of its data and rea-
sons to facilitate meaningful comment").
124. See Baruch Fischoff et al., The Public vs. "The Experts'" Perceived
vs. Actual Disagreements About the Risks of Nuclear Power, in THE ANALYSIS
OF ACTUAL VERSUS PERCEIVED RISKS 230-49 (Vincent T. Covello et al.
eds., 1983); D. Litai et al., The Public Perception of Risk, in THE ANALYSIS
OF ACTUAL VERSUS PERCEIVED RISKS 213-24 (Vincent T. Covello et al.
eds., 1983).
125. See Michael W. Grainey, Nuclear Weapons Waste: Recent Federal
Legislation and the Cleanup Effort, 30 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 765 (1994);
Slants and Trends: Waste Secrets, History, 4 ENVTL. REMEDIATION TECH. No.
6 (Mar. 20, 1996) available in 1996 WL 8440355.
This analysis is further supported by the risk perception literature.
For example, Kent E. Portney noted that a public who believes it will
be adversely affected by a pending environmental decision frequently
disagrees with scientists and other technical experts (such as engineers)
who have performed risk assessments for the proposed action. See
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The public's relationship with government officials evolved
from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. Distrust has been a com-
mon theme: "We are told wonderful things,, but we never see any
of the things they promise."'2 6 The public sentiment in 1991 is
evidenced by the following quote: "We've been hearing the same
crap for the last thirty years."' 12 7 In recent years, however, a rea-
sonable level of respect and a workable relationship have pro-
vided the basis for progress in the decision-making process. By
1994, the public attitude had changed. 2 8 "For many years we
asked to be involved and now we got what we asked for - so,
please mark your calendars and show up; help us to make these
decisions that ultimately we will have to live with." 129 In essence,
DOE had to re-invent its image and demonstrate it was worthy of
trust and respect.
A. Compliance with Environmental Law
At early public meetings, DOE was forced to spend substantial
time defending against public charges that it was not complying
with environmental laws.130 The public perception of what CER-
CIA and RCRA required became a frequent and formidable bat-
tle cry at public meetings.' While it may have been a herculean
task for the public to debate, scientific issues with the experts,
clear legal issues were not as difficult. For example, when DOE
missed a deadline or failed to produce an Environmental Impact
Statement ("EIS"),132 the public demanded an explanation and
remedy. In a few short years, expectations about the role of the
public in federal facility waste decisions changed greatly.
Portney, supra note 58, at 208.
126. CERE PUBLIC CONCERNS, supra note 27, at 4-8.
127. Id. at 4-8.
128. See id.
129. Id.
130. See CERE PUBLIC CONCERNS, supra note 27, at 4-9, 4-10.
131. See id. at 4-9.
132. See id. at 4-9, 4-10. The National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994), requires agencies of
the federal government to prepare an EIS for "major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." Id. §
4332(C) (i).
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After the first Earth Day in 1970, environmental hazards in-
creasingly came under public scrutiny.134 Until that time, environ-
mental problems were not generally thought of as a public goods
problem. 135 That changed with the passage of the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act,136 the Administrative Procedure Act,137 and
the passage of command and control oriented environmental
legislation. 138 These laws created the expectation that govern-
ment would intervene in private activities which result in pollu-
tion or contamination, or pose a danger to the public, and that
the public had a right to participate in environmental
decisions. 139
For almost forty years, in the name of national security, DOE
had made independent decisions without public input. 40 The
lack of mainstream environmental consciousness 141 until the
1970s, together with the general acceptance of the Cold War
buildup, allowed the acts of facilities' to go unchecked by public
opinion. The 1970s also saw the discovery of large hazardous
134. See generally MARK DOWIE, LOSING GROUND 3 (MIT Press 1995);
cf. SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH 39 (Harvard University Press
1990) [hereinafter JASANOFF, FIFTH BRANCH] (seeing the 1970s as the be-
ginning of an era in which the "legitimacy of science policy decisions
intensified as both the production and analysis of scientific knowledge
were increasingly drawn into public view through governmentally-
sponsored research, administrative rulemaking, judicial review, and fre-
quently, media coverage of controversies").
135. Environmental decision-making requires an analysis of the
common good. See generally Jonathan Poisner, A Civic Republican Perspec-
tive on the National Environmental Polity Act's Process For Citizen Participa-
tion, 26 ENVTL. LAw 53 (1996).
136. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d.
137. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1994).
138. See, e.g., The Federal Water Pollution Control Act ("CWA"),
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
139. See generally Poisner, supra note 134; Marianne Dugan, Citizen
Participation in Wetlands Planning In The Pacific Northwest, 9 J. ENVWL. L.
& LITIG. 29 (1994); Clayton P. Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation, and Collec-
tive Action In Local Government, 86 MICH. L. REv. 930 (1988).
140. The predecessor organization of DOE was the Atomic Energy
Commission. See supra note 80.
141. Prior to the 1970s, environmentalists were seen as far left po-
litically, small in number and a fringe movement.
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waste sites. 142 The perception that environmental decisions
should be left solely in the hands of scientists and other techni-
cal experts was seriously questioned. 143 By the mid-1970s, how-
ever, not only was environmental consciousness raised, but also
discharges and other potentially hazardous conditions came to
light.'" Administrative agency activity in general came under in-
creased scrutiny.1 45
By the 1980s, serious environmental laws were in place and the
Cold War had ended. However, DOE's change in attitude toward
public participation did not come as quickly as the growth in
public consciousness 146 and the pace at which environmental and
administrative law were enacted and enforced in the private sec-
tor. DOE did not promptly respond to the public expression of
concern over the health effects of the facility and the expecta-
tion that the government was responsible to the surrounding
public. 147
For decades, DOE operated without concern for environmen-
142. Love Canal being one, if not the most infamous. See generally
COLTON & SKINNER, supra note 73.
143. See, e.g., Mark Eliot Shere, The Myth of Meaningful Environmen-
tal Risk Assessment, 19 HARV. ENVrL. L. REV. 409, 491 (1995); Phil Brown,
When the Public Knows Better: Popular Epidemiology Challenges the System, 35
ENv'T, Oct. 1993, at 16, 19.
144. See generally COLTON & SKINNER, supra note 73.
145. " [T]he rise of social regulation and the resulting transforma-
tion of the American administrative process were among the defining
political events of the 1970s." JASANOFF, FIFrH BRANCH, supra note 133,
at 39 (citations omitted). In addition, during the era of open govern-
ment beginning in the 1970s, the Freedom of Information Act
("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994), similar state statutes, and the Federal
Advisory Committees Act ("FACA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 7, 8, App. § 2
(1994), were passed, and citizen suit provisions were included in some
federal environmental laws. All of these statutes provided mechanisms
for public participation in environmental decision-making as well as in-
centives to participate.
146. See CERE PUBLIC CONCERNS, supra note 27, at 4-8. See also Riley
Dunlap, Public Opinion and Environmental Policy, in ENVIRONMENTAL
POLITICS AND POLICY: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 87-134 (James P. Lester
ed., 1989).
147. See CERE PUBLIC CONCERNS, supra note 27, at 4-8.
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tal regulation. 4 8 After environmental regulations were passed,
DOE denied that it was subject to them, arguing that it was
shielded by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.149 In a series of
decisions, the Supreme Court held that DOE was not obliged to
follow state environmental law. 50 Thus, legal remedies were se-
verely limited. While a class action brought by local residents at
Fernald resulted in a large settlement,' overall, the public was
dissatisfied with DOE's management decisions. 152
The turning point in the legal history of Fernald is marked by
the passage of the Federal Facilities Compliance Act ("FFCA"). 53
While some commentators criticized FFCA as too limited in
scope, 154 a more critical review of its power demonstrates its
scope and effectiveness. The requirement that federal facilities
enter into contracts with the host state(s) as well as EPA is a key
provision which forces compliance with environmental laws.'
Environmental laws, in turn, include provisions that require DOE
compliance with all applicable legal rules and regulations, 15 6 in-
148. See generally, id. at ES-1, 2-4 to 2-6.
149. See United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607 (1992)
(holding that Congress had not waived the federal government's sover-
eign immunity for punitive fines).
150. See supra note 36. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, FROM RE-
SOURCES TO RECOVERY 564 (Celia Campbell-Mohm et al. eds., 1993).
151. See CERE PUBLIC CONCERNS, supra note 27, at 4-5.
152. See id. at 4-8.
153. Federal Facilities Compliance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1995).
154. Compare Margaret K. Minister, Federal Facilities and the Deterrence
of Environmental Hazards: The Case for Criminal Prosecution of Federal Em-
ployees, 18 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 137, 141-45 (1994) (arguing that federal
environmental law has had little impact at federal facilities), and Shere,
supra note 143, at 490 (arguing that federal environmental risk assess-
ment is void of public participation requirements).
155. See CERE PUBLIC CONCERNS, supra note 27, at 2-9 to 2-10.
156. These include: Solid Waste Disposal Act, as amended by
RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k, Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C.§§ 2601-2692, Uranium Mill Tailings Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7911-7942, Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d, Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7 4 01- 7 6 71q, Water Pollution Prevention and Control
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376, Safety of Public Water Systems ("Safe
Drinking Water Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-j, Federal Insecticide, Fungi-
cide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y, Endangered Species
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cluding guidance documents which mandate aggressive public
participation programs.15 7
DOE's agreement to follow environmental laws greatly ad-
vanced public' participation, and ultimately public acceptance, of
the decisions made about the facility."8 In the first instance,
DOE's acceptance of environmental law amounted to a public
declaration that it would no longer function outside of public
law. This was followed in subsequent years by reasonable at-
tempts to meet the terms of the compliance agreements and or-
ders covering the facility. While DOE Fernald has not been able
to meet all deadlines on target, 15 9 it has consistently moved the
RI/FS process forward. 160 Compared to other facilities, it has
made acceptable progress.161 Thus, compliance with environmen-
tal law has provided a mechanism for public involvement. As dis-
cussed previously, both CERCLA and RCRA and their accompa-
nying regulations mandate early and meaningful participation. 62
B. Communication
For decades, DOE rarely communicated with the public.
Rather, DOE announced and defended its policies, 63 and the fi-
nality of its announced decisions was predetermined. 64 There
were neither meaningful channels for feedback from the public
nor deliberation or dialogue in the decision-making process. 65
Indeed, DOE did not entertain the idea that it should work in
partnership with the public in making decisions about the facil-
Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544, National Historical Preservation Act, 16
U.S.C. §§ 470-470n, as well as state environmental law. In the case of
Fernald, DOE is following not only federal law but also Ohio's hazard-
ous waste law, and fire code.
157. See discussion supra Part II conceming public participation
under CERCLA and RCRA.
158. See CERE PUBLIC CONCERNS, supra note 27, at 4-9, 4-10.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 4-3.
161. See id. at 4-3, 4-9, 4-10.
162. See discussion supra Part II.
163. See Slants and Trends, supra note 81.
164. See generally CERE PUBLIC CONCERNS, supra note 27, at ES-1.
165. See id. at ES-1, 4-8.
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ity1 66 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, public meetings were the
primary mode of communication between DOE and the pub-
lic.167 Typically, discussions were run by experts who used techni-
cal jargon that a layperson was not likely to understand. 168 The
public remained skeptical 169 and little progress was made toward
moving cleanup decisions forward. As the public expressed dis-
satisfaction with this process,7 0 other modes were gradually intro-
duced including roundtables, workshops, and newsletters.' 7 '
Later, a citizen advisory board was created. 17 2 The public also was
invited to participate in early stages of the decision-making pro-
cess.'73 Of particular importance is the stage at which the risk
study questions are determined. 74 At this stage, parties delineate;
and by definition exclude, the possible risks which will be consid-
ered in future work. 75
The methods developed to involve the public are still in place
today.176 DOE's responsiveness to citizens' demand for better
communication enhanced the prospects for effective environ-
mental decision-making. By employing participatory democ-
racy, 177 DOE's trustworthiness was enhanced. This, in turn, al-
lowed the public to participate directly in decision-making.
Substantively, DOE either incorporated public opinion, or DOE
co-opted the public into accepting the proposed decision.
166. Id.
167. See id. at 4-5.
168. See id. at 5-8.
169. See id. at 4-8.
170. Id.
171. See id. at 2-11, 4-8, 5-16, 5-17.
172. See id. at 4-2. The citizen advisory board is known as the
Fernald Citizens Task Force ("FCTF"). See id. at 2-11.
173. This was facilitated by the provisions of the compliance agree-
ments. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of
mandatory public participation in the decision-making process.
174. See id. See also CERE PUBLIC CONCERNS, supra note 27, at 2-11.
175. Decision-making processes that cut off the possibility of con-
sidering crucial issues have been documented in other studies as well.
See, e.g., JOSEPH P. ToMAIN ET AL., ENERGY LAW AND POLICY 443 (1989).
176. See generally CERE PUBLIC CONCERNS, supra note 27.
177. See generally Poisner, supra note 134, at 53-55.
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C. Education
Establishing a two-way system of communication 78 was not an
easy task. In general, the scientific community has found it diffi-
cult to engage in a dialogue with citizens about issues which nec-
essarily require knowledge of basic mathematics and science. 179
Americans are generally scientifically illiterate. 80 Much of the
layperson's understanding comes from the media, 8' whichoften
does not understand the science and technology it reports, 18 2 or
picks one event to cover at the exclusion of others.8 3 While
some assume that the media is the public educator,8 4 research
suggests that the media may not be able to perform this func-
tion.' During the time period studied here,8 6 while the active
public increasingly grew in its understanding of the issues facing
the cleanup effort, the media consistently provided mediocre
and limited coverage, often missing coverage or crucial issues,
over-estimating the import of an isolated event, or merely provid-
ing inaccurate information. 8 7 Based on the history of media cov-
erage in this case study, it is doubtful that it can be depended
upon as an educator. The impact of self-study should not be dis-
178. See Abaruch Fischhoff, Risk Perception and Communication Un-
plugged: Twenty Years of Progress, 15 RISK ANALYSIS 137, 143-44 (1995);
Sandman et al., supra note 115, at 585; Caron Chess & Billie J. Hance,
Opening Doors: Making Risk Communication Agency Reality, 31 ENV'T 10,
38-39 (June 1989).
179. Environmental decisions are driven in part by public under-
standing (or lack of understanding) of science and technology. See
JAMES L. REGENS, THE ACID RAIN CONTROVERSY (1985).
180. See DOROTHY HOWELL, SCIENTIFIC ILLITERACY AND ENVIRONMEN-
TAL POLICY: THE MISSING PREREQUISLTE FOR SOUND DECISION MAKING
(1992).
181. For most citizens, the source of information about current
events and scientific knowledge is the media. See id. at 139 (citing
Ralph Nader, Technology of Democratic Control: The Case of Recombinant
DNA, in THE GENE SPLICING WARS 143 (R. Zilinskas & B. Zimmerman
eds., 1986)).
182. See id. at 101.
183. See CERE PUBLIC CONCERNS, supra note 27, at 5-8.
184. See HOWELL, supra note 179, at xvi.
185. See CERE PUBLIC CONCERNS, supra note 27, at 6-3.
186. This Article covers roughly the 1980s and 1990s.
187. See CERE PUBLIC CONCERNS, supra note 27, at 6-3.
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counted, although research gave no indication as to its presence
or impact.
Yet, American democracy and political culture have created a
demand for public involvement in environmental decision-
making.188 Thus, for optimal decision-making, education is neces-
sary.18 9 The public also recognizes this problem and appears ame-
nable to educational programs. 190
Education of the public regarding environmental matters ful-
fills three primary functions: (1) it provides the public with a ba-
sis for accepting governmental policy; (2) it allows the public a
basis for choosing among expert opinions, similar to the way in
which a jury may reach a conclusion; and (3) it provides the
public with the language sufficient to engage in a dialogue with
scientific and technical experts, a process akin to deliberation in
the law-making or judicial decision-making process.
FRESH was not well-versed in science and technology in the
late 1980s and early 1990s. Its members, however, showed in-
creasing sophistication in assessing risk and mitigation. By about
1992, FRESH members were able to engage in dialogue with offi-
cials about scoping issues, 191 and science and technology studies
188.
Citizens of Western democracies . . . appear increasingly un-
comfortable with decision making paradigms in which knowl-
edge indispensable to policy is accessible only to the few who
can claim to be truly expert. The provision of expert infor-
mation to the lay public on a widening scale may be the
most significant contribution that risk makes to the politics
of liberal societies over the next decade.
American Exceptionalism, supra note 10, at 77 (citing Sheila Jasanoff, Pub-
lic Participation in Science Policy, 25 CHEM. IN BRITAIN 368 (1989)).
189. The notion that environmental education is necessary to facil-
itate public participation is not new, although not without controversy.
Empirical research is not as rich, however. See, e.g., Bryant, supra note
7, at 213. ("For participatory research to be effective, scientists must be-
come closely involved with communities .... Scientists must help peo-
ple to formulate not only questions for research, but to help them
gather and analyze data. Both parties must be involved in the proce-
dure every step of the way."). See also Olpin, supra note 28, at 964-65
(discussing public participation in management of public lands).
190. See CERE PUBLIC CONCERNS, supra note 27, at 6-3.
191. See id. at 4-8, 6-3.
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of cleanup options, 192 which required knowledge not possessed
by average citizens. Much of these educational opportunities
were provided by the DOE. 193
CONCLUSION
Those interested in the decisions must participate in the pro-
cess. No progress can be made, however, before the agency is
trustworthy or credible. "Notice and comment" or "announce
and defend" policy formation and decision-making will not pro-
duce stable and acceptable decisions in the context of high-risk,
large-scale environmental hazards. Americans are simply not will-
ing to defer to expert opinion. DOE tackled this social and polit-
ical phenomenon by establishing and maintaining trust and cred-
ibility with the politically active members of the public. It did
this by following the law imposed on the private sector and en-
gaging in a dialogue with its vocal constituency. These were pro-
vided for in the form of workshops, roundtables and meetings
which were for informational purposes and to announced pro-
posed decisions, tours, and seminars.
The experience at Fernald does not suggest that the public is
"babbling unintelligibly" about environmental issues, nor are
government officials and experts superfluous to the process.
Rather, it shows that the public can provide a powerful voice in
a decision-making process frequently dominated by bureaucrats
and scientific and technical specialists. Knights at the Roundtable
serve us best when all have the opportunity to speak and be
heard.
192. See id.
193. See id. at 2-10, 2-11, 4-8.
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